3
Since the early-1990s the advanced industrial welfare states among the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have experienced a wave of welfare policy reforms that have altered the nature of public responsibility for the provision of social welfare. In describing the context of change this paper begins with a brief examination of several demographic and social forces that have created pressures for policy reforms and then reviews the substantive dimensions of the shift in policies introduced by these reforms.
The dimensions of change include the heightened targeting of social benefits, an emphasis on work-oriented incentives, and the increasing "privatization" of social welfare. Within this context of change, the paper focuses on the growth of privatization, which takes place through various arrangements between public and private agents. Analyzing a range of these alternative public-4 private arrangements the paper develops a typology that classifies different methods of privatization according to three modes of delivery and finance. Within the conceptual framework of this typology, we can identify the various methods and clarify the interaction of public and private agents in the process of privatization. The conclusion offers some thoughts about the role of these alternative modes of finance and delivery in the future course of privatization.
Pressures for Change
Over the last two decades large-scale structural changes involving the demographic shift and globalization of the economy have generated increasing fiscal pressures to heighten the efficiency and lower the skyrocketing costs of social protection in the OECD countries. With the aging of the population in the 21 st century, the advanced industrialized member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have reached the take-off point of what Lesthaeghe (1995) As these demographic developments place additional demands on welfare spending, tremendous fiscal pressures are building on the welfare state-and especially on the younger generation that has to carry the burgeoning costs of an aging population. One example of the escalating demand for social expenditures coming our way is phenomenal costs of dementia care for the elderly in the United States. The price of this care is expected to more than double from $215 billion in 2010 to $511 billion in 2040 (Hurd, Martorell, Delavande, Mullen, Langa, 2013) . 6 At the same time that upheavals in the demographic landscape of family life are expanding social needs, economic globalization has accelerated the mobility of capital to go where production costs are low. This has heightened competition on the world market and intensified pressures to lower production costs by scaling back labor rights and welfare benefits (Standing, 1999) . Following this line of analysis, Scharpf (2000) sees tighter fiscal constraints looming, which entail painful policy adjustments that will be more difficult for the Continental welfare states (e.g., France, Germany, Italy , the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria) than the welfare states in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries.
In addition to the economic constraints generated by demographic and market forces, other forces for change have emerged based on increased knowledge about the impact of social policies that has been gained over time and heightened appreciation for the private sector. By the 1990s, after decades of rising welfare and disability rolls, one of the lessons learned involved the unanticipated consequences of social benefits, 7 particularly their disincentive effects. The idea that generous welfare benefits might inhibit one's inclination to work was at one time criticized by welfare state advocates as "blaming the victim" (Ryan, 1976) . However, by the 1990s the idea that generous welfare benefits can produce "poverty traps" or "enforced dependency" was widely accepted in OECD countries (Bradshaw and Miller, 1990; OECD, 1998) . One OECD (1991) report goes so far as to note that "dependency traps are an unintended outcome of most social security systems." Finally, the collapse of the command-economy of the USSR give a boost to public faith in the functioning of the private market and consumer choice.
Although this enthusiasm for the private market dampened somewhat after the world-wide recession that began in 2007, privatization and consumer choice continue to remain wellreceived.
Substantive Dimensions of Policy Change
These complex and multiple forces have lent impetus to modifying the central tendencies of policies that guided the 8 design of the most progressive modern welfare state --policies which emphasized (1) universal approach to (2) publicly delivered benefits designed as (3) social rights to (4) protect labor against the vicissitudes of the market. As shown in Table 1 , which conveys this shift as a movement from the welfare state to the enabling state, the revised framework of social welfare policy reform now accentuates a (1) selective approach to (2) private delivery of provisions designed to (3) promote labor force participation and reinforce (4) social responsibility (Gilbert and Gilbert,1989; Gilbert,2004) . Numerous scholars have analyzed these developments emphasizing various dimensions of the change as well as the overall movement, which Ferge (1966) was among the first to identify as a paradigm shift. By 2013, in a volume that examines the changing landscape of the welfare state Evers and Guillemard (2013:360) (Lodemel and Moreira, in press; Gilbert , 2002; Kangas, 1994) . Although Danforth (2013) Targeted Benefits. In regard to the specific dimensions of change, the increase in policies that target social benefits is described by Sunesson, et. al (1998) as a "flight from universalism." Summing up findings on this trend reported in six countries, Gilbert (2001) notes that policies aimed at narrowing eligibility criteria are focusing benefits on those greatest in need of physical care and psychological attendance. Andries (1996) 11 describes the move toward means-tested family allowance benefits in Belgium between 1980 -1995 as the method of "targeting within universalism," under which the value of meanstested benefits increased five-fold while the value of non-meanstested allowances declined.
Work-Oriented Measures. Examining the rise of work-related reforms Jessop (1994) and Torfing (1997) "The Government's aim is to rebuild the welfare state around work."
In a similar vein, "Work, work, and work again" was the motto of the Dutch purple coalition, which was elected in mid1990s and initiated the 1996 reform of social assistance (Vink,1998) . instead of raising workers' reservation wage, 'activation' for the market instead of protection from it." Similarly Alber (2010) sees the emphasis on activation as "a profound transformation of European social democracy which is of historic proportions."
According to his assessment around the turn of the 21st century the European Labor movement abandoned support of welfare policies designed to de-commodify labor in favor of work-oriented measures to enable people to go participate in the market.
Privatization. Finally the increasing market-oriented approach in the changing balance of public and private responsibility for the finance and delivery of social benefits has been well documented, variously referred to as the "contract state" (Eardley, 1997; Weatherly, 1994 ) the "Hollow State" (Milward and Provan 1993) the "New Welfare Mix" (Evers and Svetlik, 1993 ) and more 14 generally privatization of the welfare state (Gilbert, 2004; Marwell, 2004; Zehavil, 2012) . Empirically, the growing role of private financing among the OECD countries was initially calculated by Adema and Einerhand (1998) .
At the same time, the trend toward privatization was also quite evident in the increasing role of private providers in the delivery of social benefits. Thus, for example, in Germany for-profit agencies were excluded by law from providing long-term care until the mid-1990s. When a new long-term insurance scheme opened the door to commercial providers in 1994, they jumped at the opportunity and by 2000 for-profit providers accounted for half of all the services and one-third of the long-term care personnel (Alber, 2003) . Between 1995 and 1998 for-profit providers in Norway experienced a 10% increase in their share of residential home for children and youth (Slettebo,2000) . And between 1979 and 1996 in the United Kingdom the proportion of all public expenditures on personal social services contracted out 15 to the private sector more than tripled, from 11-to-34 percent ( Burchardt, 1997 (Trattner, 1999) . And 1before the earliest state-sponsored pensions were introduced in Germany, religious bodies organized major welfare associations, such as the Catholic Caritas and the Protestant Diako'nia. With about 800,000 staff, these charitable agencies are among Europe's largest employers (Alber,2003) .
Although social provisions by private agencies have long been a feature of many welfare states, since the 1990s private activity by both voluntary and for profit organizations has vastly expanded to the point that modern welfare states are in the midst of a significant restructuring of the mixed economy of welfare. 1
This development is advanced by policies that limit the direct role of the state and increase private activity in the financing and delivery of social benefits with the aim of reducing public expenditure and increasing the quality of social welfare provisions (Gilbert and Terrell, 2013) . Privatization is accelerating at different speeds along the avenues of finance and delivery. The private financing of social protection is expanding slowly but steadily, while the private sector's involvement in the delivery of publicly funded social provisions has advanced rapidly in many fields.
In examining the alternatives in financing and delivery of social welfare provisions there are three fundamental modes for 16 increasing private responsibility. As illustrated in the Netherlands, France, and Denmark opened the provision of employment services to private providers through third-party contracts, while Germany opted to provide vouchers, which allowed those in need of employment services to purchase them from private providers on the market (Lodemel and Moreira, in press ). In the United States public housing that was once offered mainly as a provision in-kind financed and produced directly by the state, has been largely replaced by Section 8 housing vouchers that allow 3.5 million low-income residents to rent in the private market Gilbert and Terrell, 2013) . In Sweden families are eligible to receive vouchers amounting to 75% of public education costs, which can be used to send their children to independent schools. Since 1991 the number of independent schools in Sweden has increased five-fold, including more than one quarter These third-party-purchase-of-service arrangements can take several forms such as: fixed price, cost plus, and pay for performance (extra profit linked to outcomes) contracts. And there is also a special case of proxy-shopping proposed by RoseAckerman (1983), which requires that the for-profit service provider attract a significant proportion of paying customers.
These customers serve as "proxy shoppers" for public funders. In this way, government agency's can use the behavior of private consumers to indirectly monitor the cost and quality of private services. The proxy-shopping proposal draws attention to one of the fundamental issues in third-party contract for service 21 arrangements. In theory private providers are expected to be more responsive and efficient than public bureaucracies because the private sector supposedly benefits from the discipline of the market economy wherein competition and consumer choice generate efficiency, accountability and innovation which heightens the quality and lowers the cost of services. However, despite efforts to introduce a market-oriented approach to the provision of social welfare, these arrangements simply do not generate the discipline of market exchange. Third-party contracts by their very nature fail to provide the kind of consumer signals that serve to regulate cost and quality in the competitive market.
Under third-party contracts, the government as the first-party buyer pays for but does not consume the services acquired; the citizen as second-party, consumes but does not pay for the services received -while the third-party, the for-profit pr1oducer, stands in the highly advantageous position of dealing with a buyer who rarely sees what is purchased and a consumer who never bears the expense. were unionized compared to 37% of the public sector employees (Mayer,2004) . Instead of being outsourced globally, the production and delivery of social services is currently being outsourced through third-party contracts to the private sector.
Indirect Spending Via Partial Subsidies for Private
Spending. The mode of privatization based on outsourcing and vouchers is directly financed through government activities of taxing and spending. In contrast, the second mode of privatization 24 involves social welfare provisions such as health insurance, pensions, housing, day care and rehabilitation services that are financed voluntarily through private payments by organizations and individuals. As Shown in Figure 1 these private social expenditures have been increasing substantially over the last two decades. subsidies. This mix of public and private spending on social welfare includes various transactions such as a service that is initially privately purchased by a consumer, who is partially reimbursed later through a tax deduction and a private organization's investment in the production and delivery of social provisions, for which it is later compensated by public funds.
Although Pigou (1930) recognized that special tax deductions and exemptions represent a form of social expenditure, these expenses remained off the ledger of conventional accounting for public spending in the U.S. until 1974. The U.S, was among the first counties to systematically collect and report information on this form of social spending under the label of "tax expenditures" (Surrey, 1974) . Today tax expenditures are widely included in the calculation of public spending on social welfare (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989; Howard, 1999) . These expenditures are a way of indirectly subsidizing the private production and delivery of social 26 welfare through tax deductions, exemptions and credits for private purchases of certain benefits such as day care, housing, employment related private health insurance and old age pensions. They are indirect subsidies in the sense that, for example, rather than the government's taxing a citizen and then sending her a voucher to privately purchase a day care service, tax expenditures provide a credit that subsidizes the private purchase of a day care service after the purchase has been made.
In both cases the government has subsidized the citizen's purchase of day care, once directly with tax money that it With the growth of private schemes and the shrinking of public benefits, the percent of retirement income from public pensions has declined relative to that derived from private pension plans (Park and Gilbert, 1999) . As the elderly come to depend more on retirement income from defined contribution plans, they may voluntarily increase the age of retirement to raise the level of their benefits.
The movement in social welfare pensions toward private individualized accounts and defined contribution plans partially subsidized by favorable tax treatment may be a harbinger of the approach to privatization that will be favored by policy makers in the process of restructuring the mixed economy of social welfare.
That is, using tax incentives and partial subsidies as a basic form of public support for private responsibility to achieve financial 35 independence through increased work effort in the market economy. In the U.S. this approach can also been seen in the increasing growth of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which uses tax incentives to subsidize low-wage workers. At a cost of $42 billion in 2009, the EITC was the third largest U.S social welfare program targeted at low-income families (Spar, 2011) . In the process of restructuring the mixed economy of social welfare to advance public support for increased private responsibility the welfare state emerges more as a handmaiden than a counterforce to the market economy. 
